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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

)
ZACKARIAH FLOYD HILLMAN, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

NOS. 47038-2019 & 47039-2019
BINGHAM COUNTY NOS. CR-2018-1030 &
CR-2018-1655
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Zackariah Hillman appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished jurisdiction in his case.

In not following the rider staffs recommendation for

probation, the district court did not sufficiently consider the reasons the rider staff gave for their
recommendation despite Mr. Hillman's informal disciplinary issues during the program.

As

such, this Court should remand this case for an order placing Mr. Hillman on probation.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a global plea agreement, Mr. Hillman pied guilty to one count of burglary for
shoplifting at a Walmart and one count of assault with intent to commit a serious felony
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(amended from assault on certain personnel). (47038 R., p.88; 47039 R., p.80.) In exchange, the
State agreed to dismiss two other counts and to recommend concurrent sentences consistent with
the recommendations of the presentence report (PSI). (47038 R., p.89; 47039 R., p.81.) The
plea agreement also included a binding sentencing recommendation in regard to the assault
charge - that the unified sentence on that charge would not exceed five years. 1 (47038 R., p.89;
47039 R., p.81.) The district court agreed to be bound in that particular regard. (Tr., p.12,
Ls.19-21. )2
The PSI ultimately recommended the district court retain jurisdiction unless Mr. Hillman
(PSI, p.18.)3

was accepted into a problem-solving court.

The PSI materials noted that

Mr. Hillman suffers from several mental health issues. For example, a neurocognitive evaluation
conducted in 2017 diagnosed Mr. Hillman with: (1) executive function deficit and associate

1

The plea agreement also included a stipulation that Mr. Hillman would be released to pretrial
services following entry of his plea. (47038 R., p.89; 47039 R., p.82.) That release was
subsequently revoked because Mr. Hillman failed to check in with his supervising officer or
show for urinalysis tests. (47038 R., pp.104-11; 47039 R., pp.102-12; but see Sent. Tr., p.10,
Ls.9-20 (Mr. Hillman asserting he had not missed any scheduled check-ins and that one of the
missed UAs was excused); see also PSI, pp.24-36 (the GAIN-I evaluation noting Mr. Hillman
did not meet the criteria for treatment for substance abuse issues nor diagnosing him with any
substance use disorders).) He had also been initially released in Case No.47038, but that release
(See generally 47038
was revoked when the charges in Case No.47039 were filed.
R., pp.53-62.)
2
Although all the transcripts in this case are provided in one electronic document (though two
copies were provided, one with the record in each case on appeal), the transcript of the
sentencing hearing is independently paginated within that document. Additionally, the
transcripts of the change of plea and rider review hearing are provided four pages to every
electronic page.
As such, to promote clarity, citations to all the transcripts will use the actual transcript
page number, not the electronic page number. Additionally, citations to the sentencing transcript
will be identified as "Sent. Tr." while citations to the change of plea and rider review transcripts
will simply be "Tr."
3
Citations to "PSI" refer to the electronic document "Appeal - Confidential Exhibits" provided
with the record in Appeal No. 47039. That electronic document appears to contain all the same
documents as the file provided with the record in No. 47038, but also some additional documents
specific to the case at issue in No. 47039.
2

borderline intellectual functioning, (2) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and
(3) probable anxiety with disruptive mood dysregulation. (PSI, p.44.) Earlier that same year, the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare had diagnosed him with (1) post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD),4 (2) ADHD, and (3) "other intellectual disabilities." (PSI, p.15.) The GAIN-I
evaluation conducted in these cases gave rule-out diagnoses for (1) Major Depressive Disorder,
(2) Generalized Anxiety disorder, (3) extreme stress disorder, (4) unspecified somatic symptom
and related disorder, (5) ADHD, (6) antisocial personality disorder, and (7) another, unspecified
personality disorder. (PSI, p.21.) It also gave a provisional diagnosis for PTSD or other extreme
stress disorder. 5 (PSI, p.21.) Despite all those diagnoses, Mr. Hillman was not accepted into
Mental Health Court because: "No severe, persistent mental illness." (47038 R., p.120; 47039
R., p.114.) He was also not accepted into Young Adult Court because that program was full.
(47038 R., p.120; 47039 R., p.114; see PSI, p.6 (noting Mr. Hillman was only

at the

time of the presentence report).)
The district court ultimately decided to retain jurisdiction m Mr. Hillman's case.
(Sent. Tr., p.30, Ls.12-13.) It explained:
They will send me a report, at the end of your period of retained
jurisdiction, telling me whether I should place you on probation or confme you to
prison. And what that means is, if you show progress in your treatment and
rehabilitation, and that you can follow the rules, more than likely they will send
me a report saying I should place you on probation. I will follow those
recommendations
If you go over there and have problems, you violate the rules and you
don't make any progress, they'll send a letter saying that I should relinquish

4

The PSI noted that Mr. Hillman had been removed from his birthparents' custody after they had
sexually harassed him. (PSI, p.12.) He spent the next six years in group homes and foster care
before he was ultimately adopted. (PSI, p.12.) His adoptive parents remain supportive of him.
(See Sent. Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.9; accord Tr., p.25, Ls.8-16.)
5
The GAIN evaluation concluded he did not meet the criteria for substance abuse treatment.
(PSI, p.35.)
3

jurisdiction and impose the sentences. If I get that kind of report, I will follow
those recommendations as well.
(Sent. Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L. 10.) It also imposed an underlying sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed on the burglary charge, and a concurrent sentence of five years, with three years
fixed, on the assault charge. (Sent. Tr., p.29, L.10 - p.30, L.11.)
The rider staff subsequently recommended the district court suspend Mr. Hillman's
sentences for a period of probation. (PSI, p.79.) The staff noted that, while he was having
troubles applying the skills from the program outside the classroom, he was still showing
progress in that regard.

(PSI, pp.82, 85.) For example, they explained that he had several

informal disciplinary incidents in the form of confrontations with other inmates as a result of his
struggles to manage his emotions, but they confirmed "he did show progress by refraining from
hitting or becoming violent with others while in a secure environment. He was able to reflect on
situations where he responded poorly and identify skills that could have been helpful."
(PSI, p.85.)

As such, while the staff explained Mr. Hillman's conditions meant he would

struggle to meet the requirements of probation, he was ultimately capable of adhering to the
terms of probation and continuing his rehabilitation: "he has shown progress throughout the
duration of his retained jurisdiction and if he continues to work on skills, he has the ability to be
a successful member of the community." (PSI, p.85.)
The district court rejected the rider staffs recommendation for probation because of the
nature of the informal incidents during Mr. Hillman's rider program. 6 (Tr., p.47, Ls.5-21.)
However, it decided to change one year of the fixed term of his sentences to two years. 7

6

While Judge Simpson handled the majority of the case, Judge Shindurling handled the rider
review hearing. (See generally R.)
7
The district court also noted: "I don't know whether he still has a full 35, but you're
certainly -- if he does have that right, you're -- you're free to make that motion to the Court as
4

(Tr., p.47, Ls.22-24; see 47038 R., pp.140-41.) Mr. Hillman filed notices of appeal timely from
the orders relinquishing jurisdiction. (47038 R., pp.136, 140; 47039 R., pp.131, 138.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Hillman.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over Mr. Hillman
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001); State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430,
438 (Ct. App. 2011). Such a decision will not be considered an abuse of discretion "if the trial
court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate."

State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998).

"The purpose of retaining

jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of
the defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho
203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). In making that determination, the district court "considers all of the
circumstances to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to
determine the course of action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection of
society, deterrence, and retribution." Statton, 136 Idaho at 137.
The district court's exercise of discretion in this regard is guided in this determination by
I.C. § 19-2521. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. The need to protect society is the primary objective

well and maybe get Judge Simpson to rethink this but --" (Tr., p.49, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Hillman filed
such a motion, asking the district court to reconsider whether to place Mr. Hillman on probation
based only on the rider staffs report. (47038 R., p.132; 47039 R., p.134.) The district court
rejected that motion again based on the informal disciplinary incidents during the rider program
and Mr. Hillman's difficulty in conforming to the terms of his pretrial release. (47038
R., pp.150-51; 47039 R., pp.152-53.)
5

the court should consider. See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). The Idaho
Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means the district court should
consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on
other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v. Bickhart, 164
Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting the preference identified in McCoy does not preclude a
sentence of incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the goals of
sentencing). In other words, while the district court may place significant weight on one of the
goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the
other goals as being insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320
(2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has resulted in
abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases).
In this case, the district court abused its discretion by focusing on the nature of the
informal disciplinary incidents that occurred during Mr. Hillman’s period of retained jurisdiction
without considering the rider staff’s explanation of how Mr. Hillman had shown progress toward
rehabilitation in the way he dealt with those situations. (Tr., p.47, Ls.5-24.) That decision is
particularly problematic as Mr. Hillman had been told at the initial sentencing hearing – that “I
will follow” the rider staff’s recommendation for probation, if such was given.

(See

Sent. Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L.10.)
Specifically, the rider staff explained that, “[a]lthough Mr. Hillman struggled to manage
his emotions at times, he did show progress by refraining from hitting or becoming violent with
others while in a secure environment. He was able to reflect on situations where he responded
poorly and identify skills that could have been helpful.” (PSI, p.85.) Thus, the rider staff’s
ultimate conclusion was that, while “Mr. Hillman may struggle to meet the requirements of his

6

probation,” he was still capable of being successful on probation: “[H]e has shown progress
throughout the duration of his retained jurisdiction and if he continues to work on his skills, he
has the ability to be a successful member of the community.” (PSI, p.85.)
To that point, the rider staff explained that the fact Mr. Hillman was able to actually
control his emotions during the situations giving rise to the informal sanctions, to not escalate
those situations further, was the reason these incidents only constituted informal incidents which
required corrective action, as opposed to actual rule infractions requiring formal disciplinary
sanctions.

(See PSI, p.81 (distinguishing between “formal disciplinary sanctions (DORs &

Infractions)” and “Informal disciplinary (Incidents & Corrective Action)”).) His growth in that
respect was also apparent from the way he responded to these incidents. (Compare PSI, p.85
(discussing how, during the rider program, Mr. Hillman would identify skills that could have
helped him respond to situations appropriately and was open to having a conversation and
receive feedback about his actions); with PSI, p.11 (noting that, during a prior period of
probation, Mr. Hillman would maintain lies despite contradictory evidence, and then would be
defiant in ultimately admitting them).)
As such, a sufficient consideration of the entire report from the rider staff reveals that
Mr. Hillman’s informal disciplinary incidents did not signal an undue risk to society if he were
released on probation. Therefore, the district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction based on
nature of the infractions without sufficiently considering the rider staff’s full report about those
infractions was an abuse of its discretion.

7

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hillman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing
jurisdiction and remand this case for an order placing him on probation.
DATED this 1st day ofNovember, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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